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We consider the two-way quantum cryptographic protocol with coherent states assuming direct
reconciliation. A detailed security analysis is performed considering a two-mode coherent attack,
that represents the residual eavesdropping once the parties have reduced the general attack by ap-
plying symmetric random permutations. In this context we provide a general analytical expression
for the keyrate, discussing the impact of the residual two-mode correlations on the security of the
scheme. In particular we identify the optimal eavesdropping against two-way quantum communica-
tion, which is given by a two-mode coherent attack with symmetric and separable correlations.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.-w, 42.50.-p, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is to
make available unconditionally secure private keys be-
tween two authenticated users, Alice and Bob. Carriers
of the information are quantum systems whose quantum
nature is exploited to generate the same random sequence
of bits, to be then used as a cryptographic key in one-
time pad protocols. This strategy is based on the funda-
mental restriction, imposed by quantum mechanics, that
obtaining perfect copies of arbitrary quantum states is
impossible. In fact, any attempt in this sense unavoid-
ably introduces some noise perturbing the quantum state
itself (no-cloning theorem [2]).
To convert this feature of the quantum world into the
ultimate cipher [3], any quantum cryptographic protocol
needs to be arranged in a first quantum communication
step, followed by a classical communication one. During
the first stage, Alice encodes classical information into
non-orthogonal quantum states, which are sent to Bob
over a noisy quantum channel. This is used N times and
assumed to be in the hands of an eavesdropper (Eve).
The quantum signals are measured by Bob, detecting a
noisy version of Alice’s quantum states. After many uses
of the channel (N >> 1), the parties can share a ran-
dom sequence of bits called the raw key. At this point,
the parties sacrifice part of the N bits, from the raw key,
communicating over a classical public channel. This al-
lows them to compare the data in their hands, and to
estimate the presence of the eavesdropper on the quan-
tum channel. This second stage allows Alice and Bob
to quantify the adequate amount of error correction and
privacy amplifications needed to reduce the stolen infor-
mation to a negligible amount [4].
In recent years, continuous variable (CV) quantum sys-
∗Electronic address: Carlo.Ottaviani@york.ac.uk
tems [5, 6] have attracted increasing attention for the
implementation of quantum communication tasks, with
special attention devoted to Gaussian CV states. The
appealing possibilities of this approach are based on the
replacement of single photon pulses with bright coher-
ent states, and single photon detection with simpler and
more efficient Gaussian operations like homodyne and/or
heterodyne detection schemes. This simplifies the exper-
imental realization on one side, and can increases the
key-rate production of the protocols by many orders of
magnitude on the other [1, 7–10]. Furthermore, Gaus-
sian CV protocols can easily go broadband. Within this
research area, quantum cryptography has been one of
the most prolific field of the last years [6], with exten-
sive theoretical and experimental research developed to
improve the performances of point-to-point communica-
tions in one-way [11, 12] and two-way [13, 14] protocols.
In two-way schemes the parties exploit twice the quan-
tum channel per each use of the protocol [13, 14] (see
also Ref. [15] for DV two-way protocols and Ref. [16–
18] for CV two-way protocols based on quantum illu-
mination [19–21]). In particular CV two-way protocols
[13, 14] can achieve higher security thresholds thanks to
an improved tolerance to the eavesdropper’s noise. In
fact, the analysis developed in Ref. [13] (see for exam-
ple Fig. 3 of Ref. [13]) proved that, for fixed values of
channel’s transmissivity, CV two-way protocols tolerate
higher level of noise than one-way in the presence of col-
lective attacks. This makes this approach appealing to
achieve high-rate secure communication in noisier envi-
ronments, where one-way communication fails to provide
a secure key.
In this work we study the security of two-way QKD
considering general coherent attacks and focusing on di-
rect reconciliation. In this case, see Fig. 1, Gaussian-
modulated reference coherent states |β〉, are sent from
Bob to Alice through the quantum channel, and are pro-
cessed by Alice via a random displacement operation
D(α), with Gaussian modulation of amplitudes α. The
2output ρ(α, β) is sent backward to Bob who applies het-
erodyne detection and classical post-processing, in or-
der to subtract the reference amplitude β and infer Al-
ice’s signal amplitude α. The higher tolerance to noise,
granted by the double use of the quantum channel, is due
to the fact that Eve needs to attack both the forward and
backward steps of the quantum communication, in order
to extract information on both β and α [13].
The key-rate of the two-way QKD protocol has been
studied under the standard assumption of collective
Gaussian attacks [6]. Protection against coherent at-
tacks can be achieved switching randomly between the
single and double use of the quantum channel (ON/OFF
switching) [13]. Collective attacks means that Eve at-
taches uncorrelated ancillary modes to each use of the
quantum channel. The ancillas interact unitarily with
the communication modes and are then measured by the
eavesdropper. In this scenario, recently, it has been pos-
sible to extend two-way QKD also to the case where the
parties encode information affected by trusted thermal
noise [14].
In the present study we explicitly derive the secret-key
of the two-way protocol in the case where Eve’s ancillary
states are correlated. In such a case the Alice-Bob com-
munication line becomes a memory channel [22, 23] in
contrast to the case of collective attacks where it is mem-
oryless. Ours is the first security analysis of a two-way
CV-QKD protocol against coherent attacks. Our analysis
is based on the conventional assumption that the parties
exchange a large number of signals (N >> 1). In this
case we can reduce the general attack to a simpler two-
mode coherent attack where, for each use of the protocol,
Eve’s ancillas share non-zero two-mode correlations. In
addition to that we also consider the case of asymptoti-
cally large Gaussian modulation of the amplitudes α and
β. This allows us to work with analytical mathematical
expressions, and to find the optimal two-mode coherent
attack against the protocol, when Eve injects symmetric
separable correlations [22].
The results for the two-way protocol are compared
with the performances of the one-way version of the
scheme, and show that eavesdropping two-way quantum
communication with a suitable two-mode coherent at-
tack can reduce the performances partly below the one-
way security threshold. This represents the first exam-
ple of a coherent attack overcoming the performances of
collective ones, in point-to-point protocols. We discuss
why this happens, in the context considered here, and
finally we compare our results with other recent studies
[7, 8, 24] where two-mode optimal coherent attacks have
been identified for end-to-end cryptographic protocols.
Our results are important for the development of the
security analysis of continuous variable protocols, and to
identify the general challenges to implement secure point-
to-point communications. Our results confirm that the
ON/OFF switching operated by Alice, described in detail
in Refs. [13] and [24], represents a necessary countermea-
sure to overcome the problem of realistic coherent attacks
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FIG. 1: (Color online)In the general two-way protocol Bob
sends the reference state ρ(β) to Alice who applies a random
displacement D(α). The resulting Gaussian state ρ(α + β)
is sent back to Bob who applies heterodyne detection and
classical post-processing to recover Alice’s encoding (α).
in two-way point-to-point quantum cryptography.
The structure of this paper is the following. In Sec.
II we introduce the protocol and illustrate the reduction
of the general eavesdropping to a two-mode coherent at-
tack. In Sec. III we provide the definition of the key-
rate and we show how to compute the Holevo bound and
Alice-Bob mutual information, arriving at the analytical
expression of the secret-key rate. In Sec. IV we analyze
the security thresholds and we study the behavior of the
relevant quantities as function of Eve’s injected thermal
noise and degree of two-mode correlation. Sec. V is for
conclusions.
II. PROTOCOL AND EAVESDROPPING
We show the protocol in the entanglement based rep-
resentation (see Fig 2). We reduce the general coherent
eavesdropping to two-mode coherent attacks, and we il-
lustrate the steps to compute the total and conditional
covariance matrices. Then in the next section we provide
the analytical expression of the symplectic spectra which
are used to compute the Holevo bound.
A. Coherent Gaussian Attack
In a general (coherent) eavesdropping, Eve processes
all the N uses of the quantum channel applying a global
coherent unitary operation that correlates all the modes
involved in the different uses. However, exploiting the
quantum de Finetti theorem [25] for infinite-dimensional
systems, this general scenario can be reduced to a two-
mode coherent attack. The parties can apply symmetric
random permutations of the classical data in such a way
that for N >> 1, the cross correlations between distinct
uses of the two-way communication can be neglected.
3The global coherence of the attack is so reduced to a
two-mode coherence, between the forward and backward
channels involved in each round-trip quantum communi-
cation.
This residual two-mode coherent attack, in the most
typical case, is implemented by two beam splitters of
transmissivity T [26], where Eve mixes two ancillary
modes E1 and E2 (see Fig. 2). These two ancillas belong
to generally larger set of modes, {E1, E2, e}, defining
the pure initial quantum state owned by the eavesdrop-
per. The two-mode Gaussian state ρE1E2 is generally-
correlated and described by the following covariance ma-
trix (CM)
VE1E2 =
(
ωI G
G ωI
)
, G :=
(
g 0
0 g′
)
. (1)
Here the parameter ω describes the variance of the ther-
mal noise injected by Eve in the beam splitters, I =
diag(1, 1), Z = diag(1,−1), and matrix G accounts for
the specific two-mode correlations employed by Eve to
eavesdrop. The parameters ω, g and g′ must fulfill the
conditions given in Ref. [22], in order to represent a
physical attack. Note that the properties of this type
of non-Markovian channel have been recently studied in
the context of relay-based continuous variable quantum
cryptography [7, 8], where they have been also classified
and grouped in three possible cases. More recently it has
been shown how they could be exploited to reactivate
entanglement distribution and quantum communication
protocols [27].
We distinguish between three possible extremal cases:
Collective attacks for g = g′ = 0 corresponding to the
standard collective eavesdropping; separable attacks de-
fined by the condition |g| = |g′| = ω− 1, representing co-
herent attacks with separable correlations injected and,
finally, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR attacks) where
g = −g′ = √ω2 − 1 and g = −g′ = −√ω2 − 1. These
three eavesdropping strategies are not equivalent, and in
next section we will identify the optimal one.
B. Entanglement based protocol
We perform the security analysis in the entanglement
based representation so that, besides previous dilation of
the quantum channel, we also provide the purification of
the source of Bob’s coherent states and Alice’s random
displacements. Thus, by referring to Fig. 2, we first
assume that Bob’s coherent states originate from two-
mode squeezed vacuum states (EPR states), which are
zero mean Gaussian state is described by the CM
VB1B′1
=
(
µBI
√
µ2B − 1Z√
µ2B − 1Z µBI
)
. (2)
where the variance parameter µB quantifies the entangle-
ment and also the local thermal noise in modes B1 and
B′1. The heterodyne measurement performed by Bob on
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FIG. 2: (Color online)Entanglement based representation of
the two-way QKD protocol. Bob prepares reference coherent
states |β〉. This can be done by heterodyning one part of an
EPR state. One mode is measured (B1), while the other, B
′
1
is sent to Alice through an insecure quantum channel. Alice
applies a random displacement of the reference state, D(α),
which can be implemented by a beam splitter with transmis-
sivity η and another EPR state. Choosing appropriately the
transmissivity η, and the variance of her EPR state, Alice
sends displaced output state ρ(α,β) back to Bob. These are
heterodyned and classically post-processed by Bob. In this
way he recovers Alice’s encoding by subtracting the known
reference amplitude β. The information encoded in the am-
plitude α is then used to obtain the raw key.
mode B1, remotely projects mode B
′
1 on a coherent state
traveling forward (from Bob to Alice) through the quan-
tum channel. Its amplitude is classically modulated with
a Gaussian distribution having variance µ = µB − 1.
At Alice’s station the random displacement D(α) can
be implemented by means of a beam splitter of trans-
missivity η. This mixes the incoming mode C1 with a
mode A′, coming from Alice’s EPR pairsA and A′, whose
Gaussian quantum state, ρAA′ , is described by the follow-
ing CM
VAA′ =
(
µAI
√
µ2A − 1Z√
µ2A − 1Z µAI
)
. (3)
While Alice’s mode A′ is sent through the beam splitter,
the other mode A is heterodyne detected, in order to
project the mode A′ onto a coherent state |γ〉 modulated
with variance µγ such that
µγ = µA − 1. (4)
This setup is a way to equivalently simulate Alice’s ran-
dom displacements. In fact, for simplicity, consider the
case where Eve is absent and there is no loss and noise
in the quantum channel. In this scenario Alice receives
|β〉 and must send |β + α〉 = D(α)|β〉 back to Bob. We
can see that using the setup with the beam splitter, Alice
prepares her output mode C2 into the coherent state
|√ηβ +
√
1− ηγ〉. (5)
4Now, in order to obtain a coherent state of the form |β+
α〉 from Eq. (5), we design Alice’s beam splitter to have
transmissivity η → 1, and we assume that the coherent
amplitude γ →∞ in such way that
γ =
α√
1− η .
This is possible in theory by using an EPR input state
for Alice with divergent variance µγ + 1 where
µγ :=
µ
1− η . (6)
Under these assumptions we get
|√ηβ +
√
1− ηγ〉 ≃ |β + α〉.
III. KEY-RATE, HOLEVO FUNCTION AND
MUTUAL INFORMATION
In direct reconciliation the parties use Alice’s ampli-
tudes α to prepare the secret key. This means that, dur-
ing the classical procedure of parameter estimation, er-
ror correction and privacy amplification, Bob infers the
values of Alice’s variables α from the results of his mea-
surements. The security performances are quantified by
the asymptotic secret-key rate
R := IAB − χEA (7)
which is defined as the difference between Alice-Bob’s
mutual information IAB and the Holevo function χEA
which upper bounds Eve-Alice’s mutual information.
The advantage of using the entanglement based rep-
resentation od Sec. II B, relies on the fact that we do
not need to know the details of the coherent operations
performed by Eve on the modes. Instead, we can com-
pute the function χEA from the output quantum state
of Alice and Bob [6]. More precisely we compute Eve’s
Holevo information as
χEA = SE − SE|α, (8)
where SE is the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s total
output modes, which coincides with the von Neumann
of Alice’s and Bob’s total output modes B1, A,A
′′, B2.
The other quantity is the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s
output modes conditioned on Alice’s detection α. This
is equal to the von Neumann entropy of Bob’s output
modes B1, B2 conditioned on α.
For Gaussian states, the von Neumann entropy has a
particularly simple form in terms of the symplectic eigen-
values [6]. It is given by
S :=
∑
ν
h(ν), (9)
where ν are the symplectic eigenvalues of the CM asso-
ciated with the state, and the entropic function h(ν) is
defined as
h(ν) :=
ν + 1
2
log2
ν + 1
2
− ν − 1
2
log2
ν − 1
2
.
This expression simplifies further in the limit of large
modulation µ >> 1, in which case we have
h(ν)→ log2
e
2
ν +O(ν−1). (10)
In next subsection we provide the total and conditional
CMs corresponding to ρB1AA′′B2 and ρB1B2|α and the re-
spective symplectic spectra, that are then used to com-
pute the Holevo bound χEA.
A. Total symplectic spectrum
The global Alice-Bob quantum state, ρB1AA′′B2 , is a
Gaussian state whose properties are described by the fol-
lowing CM (we use the modes ordering B1AA
′′B2)
V =


µBI φZ θZ
µAI ξZ τZ
φZ ξZ kI δI
θZ τZ δI εI

+

 gδG
gδG gεG

 , (11)
where the missing matrix entries are zero and we have
defined
φ := −
√
T (1− η)(µ2B − 1),
θ := T
√
η(µ2B − 1),
k := ηµA + (1 − η)[TµB + (1− T )ω],
ξ :=
√
η(µ2A − 1),
τ :=
√
T (1− η)(µ2A − 1),
ε := T 2ηµB + T (1− η)µA + (Tη + 1)(1− T )ω,
gε := 2(1− T )
√
ηT ,
δ :=
√
Tη(1− η)[µA − TµB − (1− T )ω],
gδ := −(1− T )
√
(1− η). (12)
To obtain the symplectic spectrum of the CM of Eq.
(11), we first compute the matrix
MT = iΩV, (13)
where Ω =
⊕4
k=1 ω˜k, with ω˜k =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
is the sym-
plectic form. Then we compute the standard eigenvalues
of Eq. (13). After simple algebra and taking the limit of
large modulation (µ >> 1), we find the following general
expressions
ν1 =
√
(ω − g)(ω − g′), (14)
ν2 =
√
(ω + g)(ω + g′), (15)
ν3ν4 = (1− T )2µ2, (16)
where the dependency on the correlation parameters, g
and g′, generalizes the known total symplectic spectrum
5under collective attacks [13], recovered for g = g′ = 0.
Using this spectrum with Eqs. (9) and (10), one easily
obtains the asymptotic total von Neumann entropy, that
we can write as
SE = h(ν1) + h(ν2) + log2
e2
4
(1− T )2µ2. (17)
B. Conditional symplectic spectrum and Holevo
bound
When the protocol is used in direct reconciliation Bob’s
conditional CM can be obtained straightforwardly con-
sidering the CM involving Bob’s modes, obtained from
Eq. (11) tracing out Alice’s modes. This approach con-
siderably simplifies the problem. Starting from the fol-
lowing matrix
VB1B2 =
(
µBI θZ
θZ εI+ gεG
)
, (18)
we set µA = 1 to simulate the conditioning on Alice’s
measurements, to arrive at the conditional CM given by
VC = VB1B2(µA = 1). (19)
From this CM we compute the matrix
MC = iΩVC , (20)
where Ω =
⊕2
k=1 ω˜k, and we derive its spectrum. Con-
sidering the asymptotic limit for large µ and the limit
η → 1, we obtain the following pair of symplectic eigen-
values
ν¯1 =
√
ω + 2g
√
T
1 + T
√
ω + 2g′
√
T
1 + T
, (21)
ν¯2 = (1 − T 2)µ.
Using ν¯1 and ν¯2 in Eq. (9) and (10), we derive the con-
ditional von Neumann entropy
SE|α = h(ν¯1) + h(ν¯2),
= h(ν¯1) + log2
e
2
(1 − T 2)µ. (22)
Finally, putting together the results of Eqs. (17) and (22)
in the definition of the Holevo function, Eq. (8), we find
the analytic expression of the Holevo bound
χEA = h(ν1) + h(ν2)− h(ν¯1) + log2
e
2
1− T
1 + T
µ. (23)
C. Mutual Information
To obtain the secret-key rate we also need Alice-Bob
mutual information. Since both quadratures, q and p, of
mode B2 are measured, the mutual information IAB is
given by the following expression
IAB =
1
2
log2
V qB + 1
V q
B|αβ + 1
+
1
2
log2
V pB + 1
V p
B|αβ + 1
,
where V qB, V
p
B represent the variances for quadratures
q and p of mode B2, while V
q
B|αβ and V
p
B|αβ describe
the conditional variances after Bob and Alice’s measure-
ments. The former can be obtained from the diagonal
block of the CM given in Eq. (18), describing mode B2.
This is given by the expression
B2 = εI+ gεG, (24)
from which, taking the limit η → 1 and setting µB = 1,
we obtain
V qB = T
2 + Tµ+ (1− T 2)ω + 2g(1− T )
√
T ,
V pB = T
2 + Tµ+ (1− T 2)ω + 2g′(1 − T )
√
T .
The conditional variances, V q
B|αβ and V
p
B|αβ , can now
be obtained setting µ = 0 in the previous equations. Tak-
ing the limit of large modulation µ >> 1, we get the
asymptotic Alice-Bob mutual information
IAB =
1
2
log2
T 2µ2
σσ′
, (25)
where
σ := V q
B|αβ + 1 = ∆+ 2g(1− T )
√
T ,
σ′ := V p
B|αβ + 1 = ∆+ 2g
′(1− T )
√
T ,
and
∆ := 1 + T 2 + (1− T 2)ω.
D. Secret-key rate
We have now all the quantities needed to compute the
secret-key rate defined in Eq. (7). From the expressions
for the asymptotic mutual information given in Eq. (25),
and the Holevo bound of Eq. (23), after some simple
algebra we get the following formula for the key-rate
R = log2
2T (1 + T )
e(1− T )√σσ′ − h(ν1)− h(ν2) + h(ν¯1), (26)
where ν1 and ν2 are given in Eq. (14) and (15) and ν¯1 is
given in Eq. (21).
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACKS
Here we study the security thresholds R = 0 that de-
scribe the performances of the considered protocol for all
possible attacks. The thresholds are given in terms of
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FIG. 3: (Color online)Security thresholds for the case of two-
way protocol, in direct reconciliation, against two-mode co-
herent attacks. In the ordinate is represented the excess noise
(in vacuum shot noise units (SNU)) and in the abscissa is
represented the transmittivity. Curves (a) and (c), describe
two-mode attacks for which g = −g′. In particular (a) is the
threshold obtained when Eve uses maximally entangled an-
cillas E1 and E2. This case is given by the two equivalent
conditions on the correlation parameters g =
√
ω2 − 1 = −
g′ and g = −√ω2 − 1 = − g′. Curve (c) describes the cases
g = ω − 1 = − g′ and g = 1− ω = − g′. The curves (b) and
(d) correspond to the thresholds for g = g′. In curve (b) we
have g = ω − 1 = g′and g = 1− ω = g′ (d). The dashed line
is the threshold for standard collective attacks, g = g′ = 0.
The black dotted line is the security threshold for the corre-
sponding one-way protocol for which only collective attacks
can be considered. We see that curve (d) partly goes below
the one-way threshold for high transmissivities.
the tolerable excess noise, defined as N := [T − 1 + (1−
T )ω]/T , as a function of the channel transmissivity T .
Fig. 3 shows the two-way security thresholds in direct
reconciliation. In particular the red lines, labeled by (a)
and (c), describe the thresholds of the two-way protocol
obtained when the correlation parameters of the attack
fulfill the condition g = −g′. In this case curve (a) de-
scribes the security threshold for maximally entangled
ancillary modes E1 and E2. This situation is described
by two distinct (despite equivalent) setup of the coher-
ent attack, for which |g| = √ω2 − 1 = −|g′|. Curve (c),
obtained when |g| = ω − 1 = −|g′|, gives the extremal
case of separable and maximally correlated ancillas. The
black lines are the security thresholds when Eve exploits
correlation of the type g = g′. In this group of attacks,
modes E1 and E2 can only share separable correlation,
and for g = ω − 1 = g′ we have curve (b) while for
g = 1 − ω = g′ we get curve (d). Finally the dashed
line provides the two-way threshold, under standard col-
lective attacks, i.e., when g = g′ = 0.
All these cases have been compared with the security
threshold of the one-way protocol [31], in direct reconcil-
iation (dotted line), for which the collective attacks are
known to be optimal. We see that for standard collec-
tive attacks, the two-way protocol (dashed) always over-
come the performances of the one-way (dotted). How-
ever if Eve exploits suitably correlated ancillas, she can
perform a more profitable eavesdropping of the two-way
protocol. This is evident from curve (d) which is clearly
below the security threshold corresponding to collective
attacks (dashed) and, for high transmissivity (T & 0.86),
it goes below the security threshold for the one-way pro-
tocol (dotted). Thus for the two-way protocol described
in this paper, we find that the two-mode coherent at-
tack, given by curve (d), is optimal. In the Appendix we
further deepen the discussion about this result.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the two-way QKD protocol, focusing
on its security under two-mode coherent attacks. This
represents the first study for this kind of communication
scheme in which a coherent attack can be explicitly con-
sidered and analytically solved. The analysis spotlighted
the first evidence of a coherent attack beating the collec-
tive one in the setting of point-to-point protocols.
A similar result has been obtained in previous inves-
tigations focused on the alternative approach to quan-
tum cryptography, based on the end-to-end paradigm.
As proved in Refs. [7, 8] when the parties establish the
key exploiting two channels with an untrusted middle
relay, then Eve can potentially obtain an advantage by
exploiting correlated ancillary modes. Here something
similar happens, despite the optimal attack is different
[28].
Finally our analysis confirms the importance of the
ON/OFF switching strategy, in the context of two-way
QKD protocols [13]. In light of the results presented, we
conclude that the active exploitation of the additional
degrees of freedom available to the parties in two-way
communication, represents a necessary solution to avoid
the possibility of powerful coherent attacks. Alice can
decide to open/close the two-way quantum communica-
tion, therefore switching between one-way and two-way
instances; finally Alice and Bob decide which instances
to keep on the base of Eve’s strategy. In this sense the
ON/OFF switching can grant the immunity of two-way
protocols against coherent attacks. Further work [24] will
extend these results here restricted to direct reconcilia-
tion, and will consider finite-size effects and composable
security [29, 30].
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Appendix A: Optimal Attack
The result of Fig. 3 shows that differently from the
one-way protocol, the use of correlated ancillas is con-
venient for the eavesdropper. To investigate further this
feature we study the behavior of the quantities defining
the key-rate of Eq. (26) as function of the thermal noise
ω. We fix the classical Gaussian modulation µ = 106, for
which we have verified that the asymptotic limit is largely
fulfilled, and the transmissivity to the value T = 0.65. In
Fig. 4, left panel, we plot the mutual information IAB,
given in Eq. (25), and in the right panel we plot the
Holevo function χEA given by Eq. (23).
First, as one would expect, we note that the mutual
information (left panel) decreases for increasing thermal
noise. Simultaneously Eve’s accessible information, χEA
(right panel) corresponding to the optimal two-mode at-
tack (d) is the highest among the others cases (a) − (c).
It also rapidly increases for increasing ω. This attack
is profitable for Eve because she is able to increase her
knowledge on Alice’s variable α, at an higher rate than
Bob can do. To illustrate further this property we have
plotted in Fig. 5 the relative variation of Alice-Bob mu-
tual information
∆IAB = (IAB − Ic)/Ic, (A1)
and of the Holevo function
∆χEA = (χEA − χc)/χc, (A2)
of the optimal attack with respect to the respective ex-
pressions under collective attacks (g = g′ = 0), given by
Ic and χc. In the left panel we plot the case for T = 0.65,
while the right panel shows the case T = 0.95 We note
that increasing the transmissivity T , the relative varia-
tion in the mutual information tends to zero, while the
relative variation in Eve’s Holevo information tends to
increase.
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FIG. 4: (Color online)This figure shows the behavior of the asymptotic mutual information IAB (left panel) and of the Holevo
function χEA (right panel) as a function of Eve’s thermal noise ω. We fix the Gaussian modulation µ = 10
6, value for which we
checked the asymptotic limit is achieved. We also fix the transmissivity T = 0.65, for which the parties may obtain a positive
key-rate (see curves (a) and (b) in Fig. 3). The labeling corresponds to that adopted for the thresholds of Fig. 3. We have
that (a) describes two-mode attacks for which g =
√
ω2 − 1 = − g′, or g = −√ω2 − 1 = − g′ and curve (c) describes the cases
g = ω − 1 = − g′ or g = 1− ω = − g′. The curve (b) corresponds to the case g = ω − 1 = g′and (d) is for g = 1− ω = g′, i.e.,
the optimal attack. The dashed line refers to standard collective attacks, g = g′ = 0. We see that, for the optimal attack (d),
while the mutual information slightly decreases by increasing ω, the curve corresponding to the Holevo bound, χEA, increases
and with a larger rate than in any other attack. This causes the reduction of the key-rate in case (d).
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FIG. 5: (Color online)This figure shows the relative variation of the Holevo bound ∆χEA, given in Eq. (A2) and of the mutual
information ∆IEA of Eq. (A1), for the optimal attack (d), versus ω for fixed values of the transmissivity, T = 0.65 (left) and
T = 0.95 (right).
only that the optimal 2-mode attack can reduce the se-
curity threshold of the two-way protocol below that one
against collective attacks, but even that for large enough
T, the optimal two-mode threshold is lower than the one-
way protocol against collective.
